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Book Reviews
Strategic Doctrine
Planning To Fail: The US Wars in
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
By James H. Lebovic
Reviewed by Dr. Lionel Beehner, research director, US Military Academy’s
Modern War Institute

B

uglers of bad news that examine how military leaders and
policymakers have failed to manage wars that go south, such
as Dominic Teirney’s The Right Way To Lose a War (2015), should be
welcomed more in military circles. While the failure of the unfinished
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is well-trodden territory for Beltway scribes,
political insiders, and academics, who is to blame and what lessons should
be learned remain open questions. It is not enough to boil it down to
President Barack Obama’s quip, “Don’t do stupid stuff.” Bureaucracies
are stubborn creatures. Leaders are fickle.
To understand what went wrong and why, James Lebovic, in Planning
To Fail, trains his eye on the military failures in Vietnam, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. He argues policymakers deserve most of the blame, for
rushing into war with a set of options that virtually guaranteed military
departures short of meeting their objectives. Lebovic does not focus on
why we went to war in each case, or map out a set of alternative strategic
options. But rather he discusses in painstaking detail how we stumbled
into war and then looked for an exit, like a drunk trying to find his keys
in a bar.
His argument can be boiled down to this: when it comes to war, US
policy-making is often too means driven, groping for limited solutions
to problems that require greater commitments of force. Leaders blunder
into wars, expanding the mission while squandering precious resources,
all the while making it up as they go along, then groping for an exit
strategy. A better title for this book might have been “The Powell
Doctrine Reversed” or “The Bermuda-Clausewitzian Triangle.”
The reason for these blinders can be attributed to organizational
failures, political shortsightedness, and psychological biases. Lebovic
paints policymakers as political creatures, myopic and unsympathetic,
driven by unclear objectives, organizational biases, and fixed shortterm time schedules—suffering from all three of Graham Allison’s
pathologies. Yet Lebovic’s process tracing lacks the originality and
rigor of Allison, relying as it does primarily on secondhand sources and
previously articulated arguments.
Anybody hoping for a groundbreaking new insight on America’s
“forever wars” will not find it here. Nor will one find a cogent distillation
of civil-military relations during warfare.

New York: Oxford
University Press, 2019
256 pages
$34.95
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Yet, this book still deserves to be read, if not by military strategists
and academics, then by aspiring policymakers. His review of what and
how the wars went wrong—and so splendidly, like a slow-moving train
wreck—is a useful compendium to any reading list of these three wars.
Moreover, Lebovic’s analysis of the four stages of intervention, like those
for grief counselors, are helpful analytically to pinpoint how decisions by
key leaders are motivated by factors like organizational biases, resource
constraints, and artificial timelines. Such observations are absent from
much of the journalistic accounts of these wars.
Wars, like Tolstoyan families, are not all alike. But policymakers do
face similar nodes when it comes to decision-making tree matrices. In
the first stage, they decide to engage their military forces. In this stage,
policymakers fixate on short-term mission objectives—for example,
regime change. Yet too often they fail to articulate or align how these
immediate goals should serve long-term grand strategy.
The second stage is to extend military operations—sometimes
called mission creep. Here policy often becomes disjointed. At this stage
policymakers are further detached from the operational level of the task
at hand, and so they both defer to the expertise of those tasked with
fighting the war while simultaneously groping for new instruments to
use and broadening, whether inadvertently or not, the mission. At this
stage, policymakers fall prey both to rational (optimizing the payoff)
and nonrational biases (group think, tunnel vision, and so forth).
Stage three is defined by military setbacks, growing unpopularity
of the war efforts, constraints in resources, and competing priorities.
Suffering from a version of attention deficit disorder, policymakers thus
reverse course and seek a strategy of constriction. They limit resources
to reduce costs and mitigate risks. Then comes the fourth and final stage,
where the goal is disengagement, as policymakers seek to hit the exits
as painlessly as possible, handing over duties to often-unready partners,
all the while imposing artificial timelines divorced from reality or the
conditions on the ground.
Lebovic leaves some fertile ground unexplored. First, he tends
to lump the lion’s share of the blame for these wars on policymakers.
Military leaders come under only glancing scrutiny. That is a shame.
There is a healthy and overdue debate within military circles among too
much optimism among senior leaders in the field. Nor does Lebovic
really explore the civil-military dynamics of how the various crises
contributed to the mission failures. Is McMasterism a relevant factor for
“planning to fail?” It is unclear.
Second, part of his theory touches on policymakers’ compressed
timelines to get stuff done, even if it is operationally impractical or
impossible. Yet he ignores large swaths of literature on this subject,
like David Edelstein’s excellent recent book on this very subject, Over
the Horizon (2017). If politicians are card-carrying procrastinators, as
Edelstein and others argue, why not push off invading Iraq for another
day? Nor does Lebovic really delve into the preventive-war logic of Iraq,
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or the domino folk theories that dominated the foreign policy discourse
of the 1960s and 1970s. Was this a blind spot for policymakers unique
to that era? Were their concerns unfounded?
Finally, Lebovic appears to assume all doomed military interventions
should follow his four phases of failure. But he could use a negative
case to balance his analysis. Why, for example, did George H. W. Bush
decide to withdraw from Iraq in 1991 after the first stage? In other
words, by selecting on his dependent variable, we get three cases which
satisfy his theory of policymaker myopia, but how does he explain cases,
such as Panama, Kosovo, and the Persian Gulf War, that do not fit
this description?
His case studies are meticulously detailed, yet unfocused at times.
There is an important variation which is underexplored. In Iraq and
Afghanistan, for example, the initial objective was clear: regime change.
Whereas in Vietnam, it was muddled and unclear from the get-go. In
Vietnam, too, Lyndon B. Johnson was headstrong in not changing
course, facts on the ground be damned. Yet in Iraq, George W. Bush’s
surge caught even his military commanders by surprise for its course
reversal. Obama appeared to punt in Afghanistan, seeking a middle path
unsatisfactory to all parties—his liberal base, military commanders, and
his more hawkish opponents (even to some of his own cabinet).
A discussion of sunken costs makes a brief cameo in the book
introduction—I pulled out a bowl of popcorn and expected a delicious
read about how the Concorde fallacy or Daniel Kahneman’s theories
applied to the “Paul D. Wolfowitz-types” who blunder the United
States into war. Instead, there is little discussion of how sunken costs
shaped Johnson’s or Obama’s decisions. Instead, we are treated to
bland statements like “policy makers must recognize that sound policy requires
comprehensive assessment” (190, italics in original).
Finally, and perhaps most troublingly, rare is this modern book
on military decision-making by not making even a passing mention to
Carl von Clausewitz. Too bad, as this book would have benefited from
a discussion of his trinity on raw emotion, rationality, and chance in
shaping strategy. Nor, strangely, does Lebovic delve into the emerging
currents of grand strategy, or the civil-military relations literature to
diagnose the dysfunction cited in his case studies. However helpful his
exegesis of some of the organizational explanations of war, there is a
“been there done that” to anyone who has read their Graham Allison.
Even his dismissal of James Fearon’s rationalist explanation of war has
a familiar ring.
Policy failures are never preordained. While I applaud Lebovic for
attempting to pinpoint why nations fail at war, lumping all the blame on
policymakers can feel like an academic cop-out. Given the complexity of
the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there was plenty of blame
to go around.
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More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East
By Randall Fowler
Reviewed by Dr. Raymond A. Millen, professor of security sector, Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

I
Lincoln, NE, University of
Nebraska Press, 2018
272 pages
$34.95

n his book, More Than a Doctrine, Randall Fowler explores President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s rhetorical strategies in pursuit of his Middle
East policies. Scrutinizing presidential speeches, addresses, news
conferences, diplomatic communications, and meetings, Fowler argues
Eisenhower transcended the traditional use of the bully pulpit, though
he certainly exploited that venue by deftly employing rhetorical strategies
to frame national security issues, inform and educate the public,
persuade Congress and foreign leaders, and deter congressional criticism.
Specifically, according to Fowler, Eisenhower practiced rhetorical
misdirection as a cover for America’s covert operations and foreign policy
objectives for the Middle East.
As Fowler points out, Eisenhower’s preeminence in military strategy
and national security tempered outright challenges to his command of
strategic issues. Moreover, the public trusted Eisenhower, primarily
due to his image as a straightforward and congenial leader. Hence,
politicians and pundits rarely questioned his competency and motives.
Fowler elucidates the administration’s Middle East policy within the
construct of the broader Cold War containment strategy. Eisenhower
understood the Cold War was rhetorical in nature: words and ideas were
the real battleground. Parsing presidential communications, Fowler
reveals Eisenhower’s adroit use of narratives, history, and logic to make
his case to Congress and the American people.
Within this context, Fowler recounts the strategic factors—the
decline of the British Empire and its loss of prestige in the Middle
East, the rise of pan-Arab nationalism behind the banner of Egyptian
President Gamal Nasser, and the Soviet Union’s intent to exert greater
influence in the Middle East—that prompted Eisenhower to commit
the United States to the security of the Middle East via the Eisenhower
Doctrine. Accordingly, Fowler presents three case studies: the CIA
coup in Iran (1954), the Suez Crisis (1956), and the US intervention in
Lebanon (1958).
The case studies offer few new historical insights and omit details that
would have clarified Eisenhower’s hidden-hand policies. In regards to
Iran, how was it possible for one CIA operative—Kermit Roosevelt—to
overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and reinstate
the shah? According to Gary Sick’s All Fall Down, the conspiracy was a
convenient myth for anti-Shah revolutionaries. Mossadegh had lost the
support of the Iranian populace, clergy, and business community, so he
sought support from the communist Tudeh Party (1985). In contrast, the
shah remained quite popular. Hence, without the active complicity of
Iranian authorities, the CIA coup would not have been possible.
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For the Suez Crisis, Fowler does not mention the impact of
Eisenhower’s operation in June 1956 on the failed Aswan Dam
negotiations with Nasser. Granted, Nasser’s maladroit bargaining and
diplomacy were factors. But without Eisenhower’s firm guiding hand,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tactlessly broke off negotiations,
which prompted Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal. For Eisenhower,
the ensuing British and French invasion of Egypt, known as Operation
Musketeer, undermined the allies’ Cold War strategy. First, the operation
coincided with the Soviet invasion of Hungary, wrecking an opportunity
to arouse international condemnation of Soviet aggression. Second,
Musketeer hearkened back to great-power brinkmanship, spurning
the spirit of the new international order and recklessly precipitating a
potential war with the Soviet Union. As a consequence, Eisenhower
explained the main reason he forced his allies to withdraw was because
we cannot “subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the
strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us.”
In the aftermath, Eisenhower concluded Britain and France had lost
the moral authority and trust to combat aggression in the Middle East,
implementing his own doctrine with the concurrence of Congress.
Fowler’s coverage of the US intervention in Lebanon during 1958
contains some omissions and errors. Although the threat of civil war in
Lebanon, triggered by President Camille Chamoun’s unconstitutional
bid for a second term, did not fit the parameters of the Eisenhower
Doctrine, the unrest did coincide with Pan-Arabism, which threatened
to destabilize the entire Middle East, and provided an opportunity for
Soviet exploitation. Fowler asserts Eisenhower virtually ignored the
situation in Lebanon prior to the Operation Bluebat intervention. In
reality, US and UN officials were in constant dialogue with Chamoun
months before and during the crisis, urging him not to seek reelection
and to support the popular presidential candidate General Fuad Chehab.
Operation Bluebat was an established contingency plan that
Eisenhower activated as a result of the July 14 Iraq coup. His concern
was that the coup would trigger widespread revolutions in the Middle
East, abetted by Nasser. The intervention was limited to Beirut and the
nearby airport, with US Marine Corps and Army leaders working closely
with Lebanese security forces. Eisenhower’s strategic communications
within Lebanon and the greater Middle East effectively conveyed
the Americans were there to stabilize Lebanon until the presidential
elections. The phased withdrawal of US forces, from mid-August
to the end of October reinforced those messages. Eisenhower also
dispatched Ambassador Robert Murphy to Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt
to allay fears and reinforce the US commitment to the Middle East.
Hence, Eisenhower’s swift intervention and messaging reinforced the
Eisenhower Doctrine and served to stabilize the Middle East.
Despite these historical errors, More Than a Doctrine complements
Meena Bose’s Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy and Fred I.
Greenstein’s The Hidden Hand Presidency fittingly, providing useful insights
on Eisenhower’s rhetorical strategies.
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Contemporary Warfare
Temperature Rising: Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards and Wars in the Middle East
By Nader Uskowi
Reviewed by Alma Keshavarz, associate, Small Wars Journal—El Centro

N
Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2019
226 pages
$80.00

ader Uskowi offers an insightful account of Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Qods Force (QF) in
Middle Eastern affairs. He begins with a history and follows a trajectory
of Iranian military and proxy activities in the region. Uskowi opens the
book by recalling the time he met Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris in which
he said to Uskowi, “the revolution is not about just Iran, but the whole
region” (xiv). This introductory statement sets the stage for what the
book is ultimately about with regards to Iran’s military undertakings and
geopolitical intentions across the Middle East.
As Uskowi explains, Iran is a country at war in Syria, Iraq, and
Yemen, with the addition of covert operations in Afghanistan. In
large part, the book discusses the importance of the Qods Force—the
IRGC’s elite branch. Under General Qasem Soleimani’s leadership, the
Qods Force established the Shia Liberation Army (SLA), which is meant
to safeguard Shia interests and push Iranian militant ideology into the
region. The SLA consists of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Afghan
militants, and the Houthis in Yemen (17). SLA fighters are recruited and
trained in the region before being sent to Iran for additional training
in explosives, ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
among other specialized training with the IRGC.
The author also provides a history of the events that took place
during the Iranian Revolution and how the Qods Force came to be in
the post-Revolutionary era. While it may act as an independent entity,
it draws from the IRGC and Iran’s regular army, Artesh. The Qods
Force has its own regional directorates known as “the Corps,” which
cover Iraq, the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan),
the Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Other Corps
exist in North Africa, Central Asia, Europe and the Americas (139).
But it relies heavily on Shia militant groups. As such, the author also
offers a history of Hezbollah—including early attacks such as the AMIA
bombing in Argentina in 1994 and the Khobar Towers bombing in
Saudi Arabia in 1996. Other groups have taken on the Hezbollah model.
Uskowi discusses the important Iraqi groups—the Badr Organization,
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)—that form the
core of the Qods Force-led Popular Mobilization Force (25). The Qods
Force has also had long ties with militant groups from Afghanistan and
Pakistan. These include the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun groups, both
of which have experienced heavy combat in Syria. Over time, Iranian
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support extended to some Sunni groups. As the author explains, “Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), al-Qaeda, and the Taliban were seen as
fellow revolutionaries whose efforts were against common enemies,
particularly the US and Israel” (30).
Uskowi’s chapter on Iraq and Afghanistan is most interesting as
he follows a timeline of when Iran seized on opportunities to enter
both countries and maintain a presence. Days after the September 11
attacks, IRGC and Qods Force special operations officers were active
alongside Northern Alliance commanders in Afghanistan. Following US
airstrikes on Taliban targets in November 2001 in Herat, Soleimani saw
the province as a gateway into other provinces in Western Afghanistan,
which included the Farah and Nimruz provinces that had large Shia
populations (51). In Iraq, the Qods Force acted on the US withdrawal to
heavily recruit and fund proxy groups to establish a stronger foothold in
the country. By the end of 2013, Soleimani appeared to have control over
Iraq. Uskowi also addresses how Iranian forces, including their proxy
groups, were instrumental in pushing the Islamic State out of key areas
in the country. As a result, the population developed deeper ties with
the Shia-led Popular Mobilization Forces as they were on the frontlines
in direct combat with the Islamic State.
Moreover, the author dedicates a significant portion of the book
to Iranian involvement in the Syrian crisis. Key battles are explained
in great detail, including the infamous Battle of Aleppo. Following the
Aleppo victory, Uskowi explains how Iranian-led forces moved east
and established a land corridor from Iran through Iraq and Syria to
Lebanon, the Mediterranean, and the Israeli northern fronts (88). These
successes from 2017 onward have been major contributing factors to
Iranian expansion, which includes influence on the Arabian Peninsula.
In Yemen, the Houthis took over the country’s capital, Sanaa, and within
days, the IRGC-linked Mahan Air began direct flights from Tehran to
the city to send military advisers from a range of Shia groups as well as
a variety of advanced weaponry (115). None of these cases could have
been made possible without continued Qods Force aid. As the author
explains, proxy groups rely on the Qods Force to provide not only funds
and training but also weaponry needed to fight their enemies. They
have access to the IRGC’s arsenal of ballistic missiles, UAVs, and other
weaponry, which Uskowi provides in great detail.
Throughout the course of the book, the reader comes to understand
the scope of the Qods Force. It is ultimately a “military headquarters
that gathers intelligence, prepares operation plans, provides logistics
support, and conducts command-and-control functions for its military
campaigns” (13). This is a timely book as it addresses this shadowy
organization that has not been given ample attention. Few publications
that address the IRGC and its branches. Uskowi’s analysis narrows
the focus to the development of Iran’s military following the Iranian
Revolution and how the IRGC and Qods Force have transformed Iran’s
military doctrine. This book is a significant contribution to the field and
a must-read for anyone interested in the subject.
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Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America
and the Caribbean: From Evolving Threats and
Responses to Integrated, Adaptive Solutions
By R. Evan Ellis
Reviewed by G. Alexander Crowther

Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2018
236 pages
$100.00

T

his book by the prolific R. Evan Ellis discusses one of the main
security challenges in the Western Hemisphere: transnational crime.
The main argument is that transnational crime is widespread and eats
away at the roots of societies throughout the hemisphere and requires a
whole-of-government approach to resolve.
This book offers two main contributions: it is authoritative in its
discussion about transnational organized crime groups and it may be the
most thorough discussion that proposes holistic, integrated solutions.
These elements alone make it relevant to senior members of defense
communities throughout the hemisphere. But this book also excels
in the chapters on “Transnational Organized Crime Groups” and
“Comparative Solutions.”
A chapter on transnational organized crime groups is one of the
best summaries on this topic that this reviewer has ever read; it is concise
yet thorough. The author creates a new typology of cartels, intermediary
groups, ideologically oriented groups, and gangs that allows him to
discuss a widely disparate group of organizations that have only one
thing in common—crime.
The comparative solutions chapter is particularly well done. Its 68
pages provide detailed recommendations on how to move ahead on what
could be called a wicked problem. These recommendations cover eight
different areas: whole-of-government solutions, interdiction of criminal
flows, targeting of transnational criminal organization leaders, use of
the military in a domestic law enforcement context, institutional reform
within law enforcement, targeting the financial flows and resources of
organized criminal groups, prison control and reform, and binational
and multinational cooperation against organized crime.
Several of these concepts stand out as must-reads for US strategists
and policymakers. Although several are obvious, the sections on the
use of the military in a domestic law enforcement context, institutional
reform within law enforcement, and prison control and reform are not
always understood by US audiences.
In the first case, the US Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385)
prohibits the use of federal armed forces within the United States except
for cases of rebellion or disaster. Because of this law, US decisionmakers
sometimes seek to impose that paradigm on our international partners,
which robs our partners of their militaries, often their most wellresourced capability.
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In the cases of law enforcement and prison reform, many US
decisionmakers do not understand the level of corruption in some
partner law enforcement and prison organizations. Since the days of the
Spanish empire, Latin American countries have often underpaid law
enforcement personnel, which allows transnational criminals to avoid
punishment and even continue criminal activities from within prison
walls. Thus, any holistic approach to resolving transnational crime in the
Western Hemisphere will require significant police and prison reforms.
The examples of success in this book provide a menu of changes
countries can choose and explain how the changes have worked in
similar situations. The variety of Colombian examples is particularly
useful. The Colombian government made sweeping reforms throughout
society in the early 2000s in its successful bid to defeat the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia) insurgency, which survived only due to its transnational
criminal activities.
Although the primary sources based on personal contact with senior
security service people throughout the region are notable, other sources
disappoint. The author speaks Spanish but refers mainly to English
language sources. In chapter two, “The Geography of Transnational
Organized Crime,” only 31 of 167 citations come from the region, 20
entrants cite the author’s own works.
Although there are minor factual errors throughout, such as
referring to the Spanish Gendarmerie rather than the Guardia Civil, they
are not as important as the omissions. For instance, the author makes
tantalizing mentions of illegal minerals coming from Peru and Bolivia.
But the thread is not developed and minerals do not even appear in the
index. Even worse is a total omission of Cuba or Haiti. It is impossible
to discuss transnational crime in the Caribbean thoroughly without
mentioning two of the three largest countries in the region.
This book could have used a more thorough copyediting. It has
some errors such as referring to several US Army colonels as “coronel.”
Other minor issues include multiple references to criminal bands in
parentheses (BACRIM) followed on the next page by criminal bands
in quotation marks (“BACRIM”) and later by the phrase “criminal
bands,” again in quotation marks, or “Bacrim” (with only an initial cap).
For another example, the Red Command is refered to as “CV” without
mentioning Comando Vermelho. Even more irritating, “Red Command” is
used for subsequent references.
In the end, this strong book addresses an important problem
everyone in the Western Hemisphere faces. Transnational crime weakens
the societies and governments of developed and underdeveloped
countries throughout the area. By using this book to understand the
problem better and considering the comparative solutions, US and Latin
American strategists and policymakers can improve their capabilities to
deal with these issues and mitigate the negative impact transnational
crime has on all of our societies.
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Radical Inclusion: What the Post-9/11 World
Should Have Taught Us about Leadership
By Martin Dempsey and Ori Brafman
Reviewed by Lt Col Derek W. Beck, US Air Force Reserves

R
Arlington, VA: Missionday,
2018
175 pages
$26.95

adical Inclusion argues one can attract more bees with honey than
with vinegar. The book argues that seeking to include people (a
radical ideal in today’s society, per the authors) versus creating walls (as
we are prone to do) will lead to greater success, be it in business or
civil-military operations in war-torn Afghanistan. Primarily a leadership
book, the text is bolstered by stories from the two authors’ lives, though
it is heavy on examples from the life of General Martin E. Dempsey, US
Army retired, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011–15).
As outlined in the preface, the book’s thesis is what the authors call
the “digital echo, where information passes from individual to individual
more quickly but in the process often becomes distorted” (xii, italics
in original). Simply put, this concept is just the faster-moving digital
equivalent of how information has always grown more distorted with
each retelling. The authors treat this as a neutral force, ignoring actions
such as overt efforts to inject misinformation. The preface concludes
with six “concrete leadership tools” that are anything but concrete, but
aim to inspire inclusion: (1) create a team’s sense of belonging; (2) make
each team member’s contribution matter; (3) be an imaginative leader;
(4) instead of paralysis by overanalysis, “develop a bias for action”; (5)
empower the organization at all levels; and (6) relinquish control to make
the team self-sustaining (xiii–xiv). In other words, the book’s preface
gives some fuzzy and largely derivative advice as concrete leadership
tools, but it is the kind of advice found in nearly all leadership books,
albeit described in this one with different buzzwords.
Throughout, Radical Inclusion gives various lengthy examples to make
its points. An early example of a narrative’s power comes from coauthor
Ori Brafman’s experience. While at the University of California, Berkley,
Brafman, a vegan, protested the eating of animals. His initial efforts
were not inclusive and included shaming carnivores. As a result, he
encountered many obstacles.
Soon after, Brafman and a friend seized upon an idea to set up
a restaurant across from a McDonald’s to sell veggie burgers, dubbed
the “McVegan.” When he shifted the message from debating with meat
eaters to making veganism inclusive, hip, and fun, by selling T-shirts and
giving away free McVegan burgers, people got curious. Even carnivores
were curious. People loved the shirts. After briefly flirting with pursuing
a lawsuit despite local public opinion, in the end, McDonald’s introduced
its own McVegan locally (20).
Brafman helped bring veganism into the mainstream, and
McDonald’s ultimately benefited—not by fighting against the vegan
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burger but by embracing it. That is inclusion: even vegans can come
have a burger at Berkley’s McDonald’s. McDonald’s recently began
experimenting with a McVegan burger in select markets worldwide,
although it is currently not widely available in the United States.
A more pragmatic view is McDonald’s simply responded to market
forces just as the Filet-O-Fish was added to its menu when revenues
declined in response to Catholic customers avoiding meat during Lent.
Without Brafman’s veggie burger, it would have happened eventually.
Thus, is this really a story of radical inclusion or merely a natural result
of a responsive capitalistic entity seeking to increase profits? Or maybe
it was both.
In another example, Dempsey, as a young Army officer in Germany
in 1975, had written off some of his less stellar soldiers as “disgruntled
draftees . . . including several who were awaiting judicial punishment
and discharge for charges involving drugs, racism, and violence” (84).
At one point, a local nun arrived on post to talk with those disgruntled
soldiers. Dempsey later asked her why she had wanted to talk to them.
She responded, “Well, have you given up on them?” Dempsey realized
he had, and vowed to do so never again. Decades later, one of those
soldiers, then a high-ranking sergeant, thanked Dempsey for giving him
a second chance (84–86).
Simply put, leadership is hard and cannot be distilled to being
inclusive. Moreover, the book cherry-picks its examples and glosses over
them to serve the points it tries to make before moving on. If the reader
examines any example too closely, it will reveal more questions than
answers. And there is no discussion about the needs of the many (or the
country or the service) outweighing the needs of the few that the authors
argue need to feel included. The discussions about when the mission
must supersede the needs of inclusion are also absent.
As a leadership book, Radical Inclusion is as good as any. But that is
a low bar. Radical Inclusion is filled with catchy phrases, such as “digital
echo,” “radical inclusion,” and “develop a bias for action,” that give
little new insights. Even the concrete examples proposed in the book’s
preface are little more than catchphrases derivative of what many other
books have described. There is nothing radical about Radical Inclusion.
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Modern Powers
AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley,
and the New World Order
By Kai-Fu Lee
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2018
272 pages
$28.00

K

ai-Fu Lee, the author of AI Superpowers, is a “social media rock star”
with 50 million followers primarily on Sina Weibo, a Chinese social
media platform, and 1.61 million followers on Twitter (@kaifulee) in the
West. He is a leading expert on China and artificial intelligence (AI) with a
pedigree that includes a PhD in computer science from Carnegie Mellon
University as well as experience as the former president of Google
China. Presently, he leads a Chinese technology investment company
with approximately $2 billion assets under management.
While this best-selling book is not a strategically focused military
work per se, the emerging military significance of AI and China’s
growing capacity in this field more than justifies a review.
AI Superpowers is divided into an introduction, nine chapters,
acknowledgments, notes, and an index. The chapters are “China’s Sputnik
Movement” (AlphaGo’s triumph over the human Go master Ke Jie);
“Copycats in the Coliseum” (China’s predatory and semi-illicit internet
sector); “China’s Alternate Internet Universe” (an alternate Silicon Valley
ecosystem); “A Tale of Two Countries” (China’s government support
for AI trumps US AI expertise); “The Four Waves of AI” (internet,
business, perception, and autonomous); “Utopia, Dystopia, and the Real
AI Crisis” (the coming crisis of jobs and inequality); “The Wisdom of
Cancer” (Kai-Fu Lee’s humanism epiphany); “A Blueprint for Human
Coexistence with AI” (human dignity and social investment); and “Our
Global AI Story” (global wisdom related to AI disruption potentials for
humanity). The index is well developed and the references include an
adequate number of sources presented in an italicized sentence fragment
notation system found in popular books. Given the work is really derived
from Lee’s insider understanding of China and its relationship to AI
development, however, such references can be considered secondary to
his functioning as the primary source himself.
The main theme of the book is the Chinese work ethic and approach
to business (a cutthroat fight over market dominance that can quickly
devolve into criminality). The book also addresses China’s massive
online data-rich environment, which is required for deep learning that
enables AI algorithms and is far more important than the US advantage
in world-class human AI researchers (14–17).
This thematic focus takes place in the context of US and Chinese
corporate interests that are “construct[ing] the ‘power grids’ for the AI
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age: privately controlled computing networks that distribute machine
learning across the economy, with the corporate giants acting as ‘utilities’”
(84). A distressing side note related to this topic is that Microsoft
Research China, founded in 1998 under Lee’s stewardship, has been
responsible for training “over five thousand AI researchers, including
top executives at Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Lenovo, and Huawei” (89).
From the reviewer’s perspective, this has represented, in hindsight, an
epic transfer of technology to mainland China.
However the book has little to say about great-power competition
and the potential for military conflict between the United States and
China. From Lee’s perspective, a fait accompli has taken place with China
expected to be the increasingly dominant global AI power. That such
an emerging AI power is authoritarian based—the antithesis of liberal
democracy—and is already implementing this advanced technology
for domestic social control purposes is never mentioned in the work.
Concern over such “AI race[s]” and “international military contests”
is viewed as secondary to “what [AI] will do to our labor markets and
social systems” (227–28).
While Lee has transcended national and great-power interests
within this work—he truly focuses on humanity’s future relationship
with the disruptive nature of AI—he is also a man who exists between
worlds. A Taiwanese national who was educated in the United States
and who has served as an executive of Apple, Microsoft, and Google, he
has transformed into a high-technology venture capitalist operating in
China. In the process, Lee has become a stateless citizen and denizen of
the global capitalist economy.
For those of us with a more pedestrian existence—and who have
sworn to defend our constitution—we should be concerned not only
with the larger disruptive potentials of what AI may portend for our
social class structure but also about the threat of an authoritarian great
power to our nation. If China becomes the dominant global AI power,
as Lee argues, this scenario may well occur.

Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold
War Crisis of World Order
By Richard Sakwa
Reviewed by Michael Fitzsimmons

M

any debates in Russian foreign policy literature revolve around a
chicken-and-egg question: which came first, Russia’s illiberalism
at home and abroad or the rest of America’s and Europe’s hostility
toward Russian power? Hence, the prominent contending themes of
Russian paranoia in Western commentary and of Western hypocrisy in
Russian commentary.
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British scholar Richard Sakwa gives ample space to both of these
themes in his latest book, Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War
Crisis of World Order. While the title suggests a tilt toward a critique of
Russian paranoia, Sakwa’s arguments are actually quite sympathetic to
elite Russian perspectives on international politics. Indeed, the book
amounts to a sustained critique of the alternately labeled “Atlantic
community” or “Historical West” for failing to transcend the ideological
and institutional trappings of the Cold War and thereby alienating
Russia. He charts a progression of Russian disillusionment through
four epochs of the post-Cold War era: Atlanticism (early to mid-1990s);
competitive, peaceful coexistence (late 1990s); new realism (2000s); and
neorevisionism (post-2012).
Sakwa’s analysis is comprehensive in scope, and his research is
impressively eclectic. The book serves as a sophisticated elaboration of
Russian viewpoints on international relations over the past twenty-five
years. Western analysts may find chapter 5, which examines alternative
visions for organizing Russia’s relationship with Europe and its other
Eurasian neighbors, especially useful. An insightful thread running
through the book is the continuity of certain principles of Russian
conservatism that are evident throughout czarist, Soviet, and postSoviet thinking. Examples include the importance to Russia of great
power status, multilateralism, and exertion of “privileged interests”
within its region.
However, Sakwa’s arguments are less than convincing regarding the
errors and sins of the so-called “Historical West.” The book’s frequently
repeated thesis posits a path not taken in the 1990s—the transformation
of the “Historical West” into “Greater Europe”—that would have
better integrated Russia into the international system. Rather than
fundamentally rethinking institutions like the European Union (EU)
and NATO, Sakwa believes, Western nations simply expanded their
remit, treating Russia more as a vanquished enemy than as a partner.
Liberal hegemony, a central concept in Sakwa’s analysis, is held
responsible for much of the present discord and is contrast unfavorably
with pluralism in international affairs. Sakwa claims that “Russian
leadership sought to adapt not to Western values and governance norms,
but to what were considered universal values and global norms” (324).
But he is frustratingly vague in defining pluralism or which universal
values are distinct from Western ones.
Multilateralism and the sanctity of state sovereignty are the two
principles of this pluralism that seem clear. But the reader is left to
wonder if it is mainly the most illiberal features of Russian and Chinese
politics that are neglected by liberal hegemony. As Gerard Toal points
out in an H-Diplo review of the book, Sakwa is guilty of “creatively
configuring acceptance of autocracy as ‘pluralism’” (2018).
Sakwa’s assignment of blame to the hegemonic ambitions of the
liberal international order for casting Russia as an outsider is problematic
for at least three reasons (46). First, this formulation paints quite diverse
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political actors within the Atlantic community with the same broad
brush. Second, it denies agency to the peoples of central and eastern
Europe and the former Soviet republics who sought refuge of a sort in
the EU and NATO precisely because of Russia’s historical pattern of
regional transgressions. Third, it is not at all clear how to distinguish
hegemonic ambitions, with all of that term’s overtones of coercion, from
the advocacy of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights that enjoy
domestic constituencies throughout the world, including in Russia.
The grand strategy Sakwa attributes to Russia seems designed for
Russia to have its cake and eat it too. Its premise is, a realist understands,
the unique prerogatives of power and a certain measure of deference
that is therefore due to Russia’s will, regardless of principles. Yet it is
dressed in the garb of international law and the multilateral collective
decision-making of an international society.
Russia has repeatedly and brazenly violated its nominal principles
regarding state sovereignty when expedient (see Georgia, Crimea,
Ukraine’s Donbas, covert political activism in Europe, and election
tampering in the United States). A simpler explanation for Russian
attachment to multilateralism rather than the principle of a “democratic
system of international relations” is that it creates a pretext for Russia to
offset its power deficits relative to its competitors (55).
Sakwa at times bends over backwards to absolve Russia’s leaders
of responsibility for their behavior. The book is littered with passages
that obliquely reference Russian aggression while somehow locating its
causes beyond Russian agency. He says, for example, “the fear that its
concerns were not being heard prompted the Russian leadership to speak
increasingly loudly and forcefully, fostering a rhetorical escalation that in
the end spilled-over into violence” (72). He refers to the annexation of
Crimea as a reunification and even a transfer. Sakwa seems particularly
uncritical of the standard Russian government’s talking points on
military issues. He gives space to only the most benign interpretation
of Russian nuclear strategy, highlights NATO exercises but not similar
Russian exercises, and appears to accept at face value Russian criticism
of American ballistic missile defense systems in Europe, despite that
argument’s well-known technical dubiousness.
In chapter 8, Sakwa’s criticism of the United States veers at points
into absurdity. For example, he decries bipartisan anti-Russian hysteria,
doubts the copious evidence of Russian cyberhacking of the 2016 US
presidential election, credulously reports Julian Assange’s denials of
Russian entanglement with WikiLeaks, equates the pervasive dishonesty
of the Trump White House with that of defenders of traditional
Atlanticism, and cites a few websites hawking conspiracy theories.
Still, despite these flaws, Sakwa’s wide-ranging analysis offers
a thoughtful, useful counterpoint to mainstream analyses of Russian
foreign policy. Those looking to devise more a more stable and congenial
future for politics and security in Eurasia will need to grapple with the
worldviews and historical interpretations that Sakwa presents here.
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Military History
Rampage: MacArthur, Yamashita, and the Battle of Manila
By James M. Scott
Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, author of Reading Athena’s Dance
Card: Men against Fire in Vietnam and Rethinking Western Approaches to
Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflict and director, Plans &
Policy, G-2 US Army Training and Doctrine Command
New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2019
635 pages
$32.95
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ames M. Scott’s recounting of the World War II battle of Manila is well
researched, diligently referenced, and accessibly written. It is, however,
not a resource that will be of professional interest to most readers of this
journal. Like its significantly less comprehensive predecessor The Battle
for Manila: The Most Devastating Untold Story of World War II, this work is
less an operational analysis than a compilation of atrocities committed
by occupying Japanese forces.
Those looking for valuable insights regarding urban combat
operations will therefore find themselves unfulfilled and better advised
to refer to the Center of Military History’s official green book analysis
Triumph in the Philippines by Robert Ross Smith. Anyone interested in
combat plans and ensuing unit actions during the battle for the city will
appreciate the tactically-oriented and narrowly-focused resources such as
the Sixth Army’s Combat Notes, number 7, and Japanese Defense of Cities
as Exemplified by the Battle of Manila; the Combat Studies Institute
Battlebook 13-B, Battle of Manila; or Kevin T. McEnery’s staff college
master’s thesis, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila, February 1945.”First
person accounts of Japanese occupation in Manila include both those by
Filipinos and foreigners who spent the war in prison camps. Many of
these were published in the Philippines, among them the unassuming
Boy Guerilla: The World War II Metro Manila Serenader by Rudy de Lara with
Bob Fancher; the scholarly A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, December
7, 1941–May 7, 1945 by Juan Labrador; the social history The Everyday
Life in a Time of War by Thelma B. Kintanar; and an essential reference
of camp life in a Manila prison, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines
by A. V. H. Hartendorp. The Philippines Under Japan: Occupation Policy and
Reaction edited by Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota Jose provides an
eclectic and often revealing academic view of occupier policies—to
include notable failures in efforts to resource the wider war effort that
includes “Japanese Administration Policy towards the Moros in Lanao,”
“Cotton Production under Japan Rule, 1942–1945,” and “The Rice
Shortage and Countermeasures during the Occupation.”That is not to
say Rampage does not include some material valuable to military readers
or others with operational interests. The initial chapters provide brief
biographical sketches of antagonists Douglas MacArthur and Tomoyuki
Yamashita, contrasting the former’s failures leading to his flight from
the Philippines and the latter’s strikingly successful seizure of Singapore.
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Many of its remaining pages concentrate on individual and small group
experiences of those interned—and often eventually interred—in the
occupiers’ prison camps or others from Manila’s civilian population
during the period between its capture in the earliest days of 1942 and
MacArthur’s return in 1945. These details along with occasional short
descriptions of tactical actions, snapshots of senior leader activities on
both sides (to include MacArthur’s grossly premature declaration of the
capital’s capture), and US soldier reactions on finding American internees
dominate the second and largest component of the text. The trial of
Yamashita and select fellow officers comprise Scott’s focus in the closing
pages. There is little new in this trio other than material regarding the
suffering of specific American, Filipino, and other nationalities’ civilians
derived from author interviews or his subjects’ personal writings.
As might be deduced from the above, there has yet to be written a
commercial or civilian academic study regarding the battle for Manila
that is the equivalent of Brian Linn’s Guardians of Empire or U.S. Army
and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902, covering early US
actions in the Philippines. We are fortunate to have resources such as
those noted above that provide multiple perspectives on what is one of
the Second World War’s most significant urban struggles, certainly the
most demanding for American forces in the conflict’s Pacific theater. It
is intriguing to consider the role its lessons would have offered had the
Allies found themselves executing Operation Coronet, the invasion of
Honshu and the Tokyo Plain. Any wishing to mine that counterfactual
ore—or seeking a single source on the battle to advise the full scope of
urban challenges yet to come—will have to rely on information available
only via wide-ranging exploration of texts, pending an offering that
more greatly focuses on matters of interest to the military professional.

Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs
of a German Chief of Staff
By Fritz von Lossberg
Reviewed by Dr. Dean A. Nowowiejski

F

ew historians write about staff performance instead of focusing on
commanders. A similar few have the language ability to translate
scholarly works into accessible English. David T. Zabecki has been an
exception for years. First, in 2008, he edited a useful two-volume set for
the Naval Institute Press entitled, Chief of Staff: The Principal Officers Behind
History’s Great Commanders. Next, in 2015, Zabecki turned his attention
to translation and editorial comment on important German memoirs in
Order in Chaos: The Memoirs of General of Panzer Troops Hermann Balck, a
translation done with Dieter J. Biedekarken. Now, he and Biedekarken
continue to bring important German military memoirs to light for
English reading scholars with Lossberg’s War: The World War I Memoirs of
a German Chief of Staff. Lossberg’s War thus combines several important
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thrusts into one effort: explaining excellent staff leadership, resurrecting
memoirs from the Great War, and exposing important foreign language
works in English.
Friedrich “Fritz” Karl von Lossberg, who became known as the
fireman of the imperial German Army, rushed to a variety of chief of
staff positions throughout the war to turn failing army defenses around.
He entered the war as a lieutenant colonel, chief of staff for a corps, and
served consecutively to the Armistice when he was chief of staff for a
German army group and a major general. David Zabecki said in his
chapter on Lossberg in Chief of Staff that, “Lossberg was one of the most
important tacticians of the twentieth century.”
The combination of the original memoir, a gripping tale originally
published in 1939, and the extensive modern update provided by Zabecki
and Biedekarken should serve as an essential primer for those military
professionals interested in senior leadership in large-scale combat
operations, staff planning, the role of the German General Staff, the
value of professional military education, and the essentiality of battlefield
calculus. The editors add important notes capturing current arguments
and historiography and clarify the few factual errors Lossberg made in
his memoir based on recent evidence and their analysis.
Fritz von Lossberg was the imperial army’s specialist in defensive
operations. Lossberg was first dispatched by the kaiser himself to rescue
the Third Army in the Champagne region when they were threatened
with rupture in 1915. The Chief of the German General Staff then sent
him consecutively to the First Army on the Somme in 1916 and the
Fourth Army in Flanders in 1917. The sequence of his individual rescues
is a catalog of critical German defensive successes.
Lossberg’s methodology was regular: when dispatched as a chief
of staff to the rescue of a large German defensive formation, he would
immediately tour the front in person, speak to all affected subordinate
commanders to best understand front line conditions, make his synthetic
personal assessment, and then return to brief the affected commander in
person. Only after these steps would he engage the new staff of which
he had been made chief.
His presence, authority, and actions would turn the situation around.
Lossberg would adjust in frontages, reserves, artillery, and logistic
support to stabilize the situation. He applied a trained, professional
soldier’s assessment of battlefield physics and capacities regarding
the importance of defensive frontage, available supporting artillery,
particularly heavy artillery, ammunition resupply, communications
networks, and lines of communications.
Lossberg was not only skilled in the science of war but also had an
innate sense for the human or moral capacity of the formations that
he led, often remarking on the willpower of the individual soldier. He
had a sense of modern warfare, as his battlefield assessments repeatedly
highlighted the emerging, significant role of airpower. He is credited
with the ascendance of the German concept of defense in depth.
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The serious student of operational art will sense the importance
of individual professional development and the study of the art of war
between the lines of Lossberg’s detailed account. Lossberg’s expertise as
a rescuing General Staff officer was built on the professional knowledge
he had acquired through a lifetime of disciplined practice, the rigorous
education given to general staff officers, and their long-term relationships
within that group.
Lossberg often disagreed with his commanders and respectfully
let it be known when he did. His memoir is an alternative telling of
the German history of World War I, as Lossberg makes clear when he
thinks strategic and operational mistakes were made. He is relentless
in his criticism, for instance, of Erich von Falkenhayn’s insistence
on continuing the attacks toward Verdun, just as Lossberg is critical
of the failure of Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff to fall back to
new defensive lines and stabilize the front at the end of the war. The
reader often wonders what the outcome would have been had Lossberg’s
viewpoint prevailed.
There are lessons in the power of relationships throughout this
memoir. Most often, when mentioning a new superior or a flank unit
or higher chief of staff, Lossberg comments, “We knew each other well
from a previous assignment.” Lossberg is dutiful and faithful in his
service to a succession of commanders, even when he saw their flaws
or disagreed with their decisions. Lossberg proves to be a model of the
imperial German Army chief of staff archetype: knowledgeable, loyal,
hardworking to the point of exhaustion, but unrelenting in dedication
to the success of the mission.
This clarity on the attitude and role of the German General Staff
is a strength of this book, carefully explained by the editors in a useful
appendix. There is much to commend this book to the shelf of the
military professional or historian specializing in the First World War.
It credibly contributes to David Zabecki’s long-term effort to help
military professionals understand both exceptional chiefs of staff and
the German exemplars of them.

The Forgotten Front: The Eastern Theater
of World War I, 1914–1915
Edited By Gerhard P. Gross
Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg

G

iven the outpouring of excellent recent historical research on the
Eastern Front, one might be forgiven for wondering if it is still the
“forgotten front” that it was in years past. We now know a great deal
more about the east, especially the magnitude of the impact of events
there from the outbreak of war in 1914 to the triumph of the Red Army
in the Russian Civil War in 1921.
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The east bequeathed the Bolshevik Revolution, the proto-Nazi
Freikorps, new states like Poland, and the genocidal battle for what
Timothy Snyder has called the “Bloodlands” between Germany and the
Soviet Union. No serious scholar of the First World War would even
consider a study of the conflict that marginalized or ignored the events
of the east.
Still, specifically because of those monumental events, the First
World War in the east lives in the shadows. But it is not the shadow of
the Western Front that obscures and distorts, but the shadow of the
Eastern Front in the Second World War. Virtually every essay in this
ambitious and important book references the war of 1939–45 either to
offer a comparison, a contrast or, appropriately enough, to ensure that
the history of the Second World War is understood in relation to the
First World War.
This volume is part of a truly impressive centennial project by the
Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed
Forces based in Potsdam, Germany, the same town where Kaiser
Wilhelm II signed Germany’s declaration of war in 1914 and where
Germany’s conquerors met in 1945 to try to close the 30-year period
of conflict. Gerhard Gross and his team have worked diligently and
intelligently to bring scholars together, publish primary documents, and
ensure that historians can treat the complex history of Germany in this
period with all due meticulousness. They deserve a great deal of credit
for their work over the past few years.
This volume is no exception to that diligence and meticulousness. It
brings together some of the most experienced scholars in the field (Hew
Strachan, Stig Förster, and Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius among them), and
presents new research on new themes, such as the place of the Eastern
Front on internet portrayals of the war. This is an ambitious and wideranging book that covers the German, Russian, Austria-Hungary, Slavic,
and Polish perspectives. Strachan sets the stage with a thoughtful and
analytic introduction that places the war in the east in geostrategic terms.
A few themes from the book’s 20 essays stand out, notable among
them the ways that the east differed from the west. Those differences
include the nature of geography, the de-modernization of eastern
battlefields, the much more diverse nature of the peoples living in the
east, and the relatively lower importance of alliances. In the east, Russia
fought with no direct ally, and the Germans so thoroughly dominated
their alliance with Austria-Hungary that the concept of alliance, as
understood in the west, does not apply.
It is also worth remembering that Germany won on this front, as
the 1918 Treaties of Brest-Litovsk transferred to the Central Powers
effective control of most of what is now Ukraine and the Baltic States,
while at the same time effectively making Poland a German satellite.
Victory in the east allowed the Germans to plan and resource their
1918 spring offensives, but, ironically, the collapse of Russia also gave
Austria-Hungary no reason to keep fighting.
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The eastern war also featured movement. Russian armies swept into
the Carpathians in 1914, then German and Austrian-Hungarian armies
pushed east in the great victory of Gorlice-Tarnów. Armies thus came in
contact with new and strange populations, not the least of which were
the eastern Jews the Germans called the Ostjuden. German war policy
had to decide what to do with them, and how to organize a region that
they found disease-ridden, unsanitary, and, because of the panic that
attended the Russian retreat in 1915, underpopulated.
However, the land could help the Germans overcome the material
shortages they were suffering due to the British blockade. The essays
here argue that the Germans did not envision genocide or even forced
removals, but a reform of the east to make its agricultural land more
productive and its people more modern.
Societies at war in the east also needed narratives, both during and
after the war, to explain to their people what had happened. The book
contains essays on literature, museums, and memory as tools for this
explanation. The war in the east became, in effect, two wars: the war for
conquest and the war for memory.
As Förster noted, the eastern front, in the end, had no victor.
Because of Germany’s defeat in the west, and the attendant repudiation
of Brest-Litovsk, all of the belligerents of the east lost this war. Czarist
Russia, Wilhelmine Germany, and Habsburg Austria all ceased to exist,
ushering in radical, revolutionary change. That change, we know now,
kept the dynamic of hate and competition burning, helping to fuel
another round of war. As a result, no one could have written a book
called “All Quiet on the Eastern Front.”
That giant shadow of Stalin, Hitler, and the war they led in the east
from 1941 to 1945, looms over every essay in this book. It cannot be
otherwise. For even if the combatants of 1914–15 (to use this book’s
narrow periodization) did not know what was to come, we do. The
Eastern Front may no longer be forgotten to First World War scholars,
but the immensity of the nightmare to come has reduced it in both
history and memory. This fine book should help to correct the balance.
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Military Cultures
Military Cultures in Peace and Stability
Operations: Afghanistan and Lebanon
By Chiara Ruffa
Reviewed by Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky, author of American Allies in Times of
War: The Great Asymmetry and associate professor of political studies, Queen’s
University
Philadelphia, PA: University
of Pennsylvania Press,
2018
204 pages
$65.00

I

f you are conducting research in the field of security studies, it
can be challenging to find scholarly work that accurately depicts
military interactions at the tactical level. Yet, to understand how today’s
multinational military interventions are conducted, this level of military
analysis has become increasingly important to explain variations in
mission outcomes. When considering the war in Afghanistan and the
fifty or so allies and partners that participated in the International
Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), it is striking to see how individual
nations operating under the ISAF umbrella may have experienced the
war in dramatically different ways. In Canada, ISAF came to be known
as a combat mission and the Canadian Armed Forces suffered a fairly
high casualty rate, while in Italy, the mission was always presented as a
peacekeeping operation, which was reflected in the daily tasks carried out
by the Italian armed forces.
While many factors play into whether military interventions are
perceived as successes or failures, a particularly elusive variable is
military culture, or how a nation’s armed forces might bring unique
characteristics to the battlefield, which in turn translates into different
mission outcomes. As Chiara Ruffa notes in her monograph Military
Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations: Afghanistan and Lebanon, “Military
culture is closely related to the national origins of a military unit, and
operates as a filter between domestic political configurations and the
way the military behaves in the field” (32). It follows, then, that the
armed forces of two troop-contributing countries might assess threats
differently and respond in kind. To get at these dynamics, you admittedly
need a complex research design, which is enough to deter many from
pursuing this kind of research. But for all who intend on doing so,
Ruffa’s book can serve as a useful guide.
In order to isolate the influence of military culture on tactical
behavior, Ruffa compares France’s and Italy’s contributions to two
missions: the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and ISAF. The
contribution of both countries was of comparable size in each case and
the deployed troops were in similar areas of operations and exposed to
the same level of threat. When we look at the range of military tasks and
how they were carried out, however, some interesting differences arise.
While the evidence is far from conclusive (and Ruffa acknowledges as
much), the case studies are instructive. For example, she shows how the
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French units in Lebanon were mainly concerned with patrolling tasks,
while the Italian units prioritized contact with the population and civilmilitary cooperation activities.
Since the French units were performing these tasks with a security
mindset, they placed a premium on force protection and carried out
these patrols in tanks, which displeased the locals (tanks are noisy and
they destroy roads). Ultimately, this mindset made them less effective
in terms of carrying out a UN stabilization operation where success is
heavily dependent on the support of local populations and adapting to
their needs. By contrast, the Italian units in Lebanon had also deployed
with tanks initially but switched to armored vehicles when they realized
local communities were against tanks. A humanitarian mindset led the
Italians to adapt their dismounted patrols and the frequent contact with
the population meant they picked up on this cue rapidly.
Ruffa explains how the different military cultures illustrated different
interpretations of what the patrols were intended to achieve. The French
prioritized zone patrolling, which was intended to “monitor hostile
activities in the area,” while the Italians did contact patrolling, which
is meant to “get in touch with the population and collect information
about the security situation and people’s needs” (75). Military culture
really comes to life in her analysis and the account is compelling, thanks
to her extensive fieldwork.
What is less clear from the book is Ruffa’s level of ambition for
her framework. At the beginning of the book, she states the following:
“I argue that we can make peace operations more successful—in their
ability to save lives, protect civilians, and avoid mass atrocities—by
better understanding the on-the-ground dynamics” (17). Can the
research presented in this book really inform assessments of success
or failure? Even in the case analysis, the only cursory assessment of
mission outcomes surveys local perceptions or media accounts. To be
fair, this critique is commonplace as decisive indicators of operational
effectiveness are hard to come by.
To summarize, the book’s main contribution is the examination of
how armies differ in terms of their military culture, and how that translates
into divergent tactics on the battlefield. While this is interesting in its
own right, it does not help us understand why some missions succeed
and others fail. Hopefully, scholars inspired by Ruffa’s book will take up
the challenge, drawing from her insights on military culture.
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The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture:
Lessons Learned and Lost in America’s Wars
By Jeanie L. Johnson
Reviewed by Dr. Montgomery ‘Mitzy’ McFate, professor, Strategic and
Operational Research Department, US Naval War College
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eannie Johnson’s book, The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture:
Lessons Learned and Lost in America’s Wars, is grounded in the literature
on strategic culture, which posits (roughly) that states have a relatively
coherent set of practices and preferences regarding policy, strategy,
and warfighting. Her objective is to examine the interplay between the
organizational culture of the US Marine Corps and American strategic
culture with reference to counterinsurgency.
Johnson begins by describing the US aversion to counterinsurgency,
stemming from an “acultural and ahistorical predisposition” towards
other societies. As a subset of American culture, US military culture
shows a “partiality for . . . conventional war,” in which political and
military personnel operate within separate spheres (46). She then turns
her attention to the Marines, describing how they develop an identity
through recruiting, training, narratives, and legends. While this identity,
which she describes as “elitist and fight oriented,” has remained stable,
the role of the Corps has shifted over the past two centuries from small
wars to amphibious assault to expeditionary operations.
While the first three chapters will be generally familiar to most
readers with an interest in strategic culture and the history of the Corps, in
chapter 4, Johnson drills down into the organization’s norms and values
to great effect. She teases apart some of the contradictions in Marines
Corps culture, including the exclusion of minorities and women from
the “mystical brotherhood,” the clash between the values of form and
appearance with the “values of pragmatism or utility downrange,” and
the tension between valuing teamwork and valuing the individual (97).
Some of her observations are not just astute but also humorous. Johnson
notes institutional frugality has made necessity into a virtue that results
in Marines excelling at “appropriating” folders, toilet paper, MREs, and
refrigerators. “In good DOD fashion, Marines have made an acronym
of their pickpocket practice: STEAL (Strategically Taking Equipment
to Another Location)” (105). In chapter 5, Johnson discusses how the
Marine Corps commitment to “doing windows”—whatever tasks are
required by the nation—is buttressed by a set of norms emphasizing
flexibility, innovation, and a healthy “disregard” for doctrine.
Part 2 of Johnson’s book transitions from a discussion of the general
organizational culture of the Marine Corps to a more specific discussion
of how that culture has influenced their approach to counterinsurgency.
After short summaries of the ‘banana wars’ and the Vietnam-era
Combined Action Platoons, Johnson indicates many of the lessons
learned or lost “are best explained as a product of a widely shared
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American culture rather than anything the Marine Corps cultivated
on its own” (153). Johnson observes naïveté and paternalistic racism
of American culture resulted in bad behavior in Central America and
during Vietnam the Corps “continued to reflect the prejudices shared
across the American public.” Essentially, she gives the Marine Corps a
pass by assigning negative behaviors such as racism, forced labor, and
unnecessary brutality to American culture in general. Johnson clearly
admires the Marines, and sometimes seems loath to criticize them.
Chapter 7 offers perhaps the most insight on the unintended
consequences of American nation building, namely “Marines, raised
in a democratic system that they viewed as exception and superior,
attempted to duplicate this system by undermining nearly every principle
on which it is founded.” In her view, Marines attempted to increase the
efficiency of Central American republics through centralized authority
and in Vietnam through popular resistance rather than centralized
government. In chapter 8, Johnson discusses the consequences of the
preference for conventional war, including the slow development of
doctrine and the aversion to performing nation-building tasks. In her
penultimate chapter on counterinsurgency in Iraq, Johnson examines
how the lessons learned during small wars were applied in Iraq, including
respecting the civilian population, understanding local culture, and
employing information operations.
Her conclusion, unfortunately, does not return the reader to the
main thesis of her book—namely, the relative impact of US strategic
culture on the Corps performance of counterinsurgency operations—
but rather offers a series of lessons learned, such as the importance
of training indigenous security forces, the importance of intelligence,
and the multiplicity of approaches to counterinsurgency. She candidly
observes how the Marines often tend to get in their own way: “The
reward system and clear hierarchy of the corps means that aptitude in
dissecting the sociocultural aspects of the war will remain an undercelebrated aspect of the warfighter personality” (262).
While Johnson’s book is certainly enjoyable and rich in material, she
has adopted a strategic culture paradigm to studying an organization.
The result is aspects of US strategic culture become difficult to
separate analytically from aspects of Marine Corps culture. A more
beneficial approach might have been to rely on the copious literature
on organizational—such as Studying Organizational Cultures through Rites
and Ceremonials by Harrison Trice and Janice Beyer (1984), Organizational
Stories as Symbols Which Control the Organization by Alan Wilkins (1983),
and Organizational Culture: A Dynamic Model by Edgar Schein (1983)—and
apply it to the Marine Corps. As structured, the main argument of the
book sometimes disappears in the entertaining and colorful details of
Marine Corps culture. Nevertheless, anyone interested in the history
and culture of the Marine Corps would certainly profit from reading
the book. Johnson’s writing shines when she point out contradictions,
discontinuities, and unintended consequences of military culture, and
one hopes she will pursue this topic in the future.

